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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Parents of a high school student commenced this action 
against a teacher, school officials, and members of the 
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school board ("the NHRHS defendants"), alleging that, by 
requiring her to submit to a blood test and urinalysis, their 
child was subjected to an unconstitutional search and that, 
by disclosing the results of those tests, the defendants 
violated the child's right to privacy. In addition, plaintiffs 
argue that the school's drug policy is unconstitutionally 
vague and assert a state-law claim for assault and battery 
against the health care provider and nurse ("the medical 
defendants") who administered the blood test. The District 
Court granted the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment and denied plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary 
judgment. Accordingly, in our review, we view all of the 
evidence, and draw all inferences therefrom, in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs. See Wicker v. Consolidated 
Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 696 (3d Cir. 1998). We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
At approximately 9:18 a.m. on April 8, 1996, Tara Hedges 
was entering her third-period class, Defendant Greg 
McDonald's math class, at Northern Highlands Regional 
High School ("NHRHS"). As she entered the classroom, 
McDonald observed that she seemed uncharacteristically 
talkative and outgoing. In addition, her face wasflushed; 
her eyes were glassy and red; and her pupils were dilated. 
It is likewise undisputed, however, that Tara's speech was 
not slurred, McDonald did not smell anything on her 
breath, and she did not smell of marijuana. 
 
During the math class, Tara asked permission to leave 
the room to get a drink from the water fountain, which is 
located within view of McDonald's classroom door. Instead 
of getting a drink of water, however, Tara went in the 
opposite direction from the water fountain and disappeared 
around the corner of the hallway. Tara was gone for 
approximately ten minutes.1 McDonald testified that it was 
not consistent with Tara's normal behavior to ask 
permission to go someplace and then leave the room to go 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Tara actually went to the lavatory and was seen there by school 
security officer, Ms. Justine Rucki, who testified that Tara's eyes were 
red and she looked sick. Ms. Rucki suggested that Tara go see the school 
nurse, but Tara refused. 
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elsewhere. Based on Tara's appearance and 
uncharacteristic behavior, McDonald suspected that Tara 
was under the influence of alcohol or some other drug. 
 
The NHRHS Board of Education's Revised Drug, Alcohol 
and Tobacco Policy ("NHRHS Policy" or "Policy") provides 
that: 
 
       Any staff member to whom it appears that a pupil may 
       be under the influence of alcoholic beverages or other 
       drugs on school property or at a school function shall 
       report the matter as soon as possible to the Principal 
       or his/her designee. The substance abuse counselor 
       and nurse shall be notified by the Principal/designee. 
 
App. 26. In accordance with this Policy, McDonald 
contacted a school administrator and reported his 
suspicion that Tara was "high." 
 
Whenever a school official suspects that a student is 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, school policy 
dictates that the student "shall be escorted to the school 
nurse for an examination of any dangerous vital signs." Id. 
Pursuant to that Policy, at the end of the class period, a 
school security guard escorted Tara from Mr. McDonald's 
classroom to the nurse's office. The school nurse, 
Defendant Cathy Kiely, testified that her first impression of 
Tara when she saw her that day was "oh, my God, she 
looked so high. . . . She just looked totally out of it. She 
just didn't know where she was. Her eyes were red, they 
were glassy, she looked stuporous, she looked high .. . . 
[She had a] [b]lank look, staring into space, looking right 
through me, just out of it." App. 180-81 (Kiely Deposition). 
Nurse Kiely informed Tara that she was suspected of being 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol and that her vital 
signs would have to be checked. Nurse Kiely checked Tara's 
vital signs and found that her blood pressure was elevated 
but her pulse and respirations were normal. Although 
Tara's eyes were bloodshot, her pupils were normal. At no 
point during the examination did Tara offer an explanation 
for her uncharacteristic appearance. 
 
"For students suspected of being under the influence of 
alcohol/drugs," the NHRHS Policy provides that,"if there is 
reasonable suspicion, the Principal/designee may conduct 
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a search, including lockers and bookbags, luggage, etc. . . ." 
App. 28. In accordance with the Policy, a school security 
guard searched Tara's locker but found nothing 
incriminating. The guard also searched Tara's bookbag in 
Tara's and Nurse Kiely's presence. The search revealed an 
old, worn, plastic bottle containing some small white pills 
and a large brown pill. Tara told Nurse Kiely that they were 
diet pills. NHRHS students are prohibited from possessing 
medication of any kind, including prescription and over- 
the-counter medications. 
 
Finally, the NHRHS Policy directs that, when a student is 
suspected of being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, 
"[t]he Principal/designee shall immediately notify a parent 
or guardian and the Superintendent and arrange for an 
immediate medical examination of the student." App. 26. 
When Nurse Kiely asked Tara for a phone number where 
her parents could be reached, however, Tara was unable to 
remember the relevant numbers. After retrieving the phone 
numbers, and in accordance with the NHRHS Policy, Nurse 
Kiely called Tara's father, Plaintiff George Hedges, and 
asked him to come to her office. When Mr. Hedges arrived, 
Nurse Kiely informed him that Tara was suspected of being 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The school 
principal, Defendant Ralph Musco, showed Mr. Hedges the 
pills that were found in Tara's bookbag. When it was 
suggested that the pills might be diet pills, Mr. Hedges 
responded: "I know for a fact that she's not on a diet." App. 
201, 242. Mr. Hedges took the pills, stating that he would 
find out what they were.2 
 
Either Nurse Kiely or Mr. Musco told Mr. Hedges that 
Tara would have to be tested for drug and alcohol use 
before she would be permitted to return to school. The 
NHRHS Policy provides that "[t]he examination may be 
performed by a physician selected by the parent or 
guardian, or by the school doctor if s/he is immediately 
available. . . . If, at the request of the parent or guardian, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Mr. Hedges did not have the pills tested, however. He claims that he 
showed the pills to a pharmacist who opined that they could be diet pills 
and vitamins. For purposes of this motion, the NHRHS Defendants 
concede that the pills were diet pills and vitamins. 
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the medical examination is conducted by a physician other 
than the school doctor, such an examination shall be at the 
expense of the parent and not the school district." App. 26. 
Either Mr. Musco or Nurse Kiely told Mr. Hedges that the 
school generally used Urgent Care,3 and Mr. Hedges took 
Tara there. 
 
Shortly after Mr. Hedges and Tara arrived at Urgent Care, 
an Urgent Care doctor, Dr. Foley, who has not been named 
as a defendant, examined Tara. Based on the physical 
examination, Dr. Foley concluded that Tara did "not appear 
to be under the influence of any illicit substance or alcohol" 
and there was "no evidence of any chronic use of illicit 
substances or alcohol." App. 96 (medical report). Tara then 
provided Urgent Care with a urine specimen. 
 
Nurse Barbara Neumann attempted to draw blood from 
Tara's right arm but was unsuccessful. She then attempted 
to draw blood from Tara's left arm but was also 
unsuccessful. The parties dispute what happened next. 
According to Ms. Neumann, after the two unsuccessful 
attempts, she left the room and summoned Dr. Foley. Tara 
testified, however, that Ms. Neumann inserted a needle in 
her arms five times unsuccessfully before asking for Dr. 
Foley's help. Tara also testified that, when Ms. Neumann 
left the room to get Dr. Foley, she left the tourniquet on 
Tara's arm. Ms. Neumann denies doing so. Dr. Foley was 
able to draw blood from Tara's arm on his first attempt. 
Plaintiffs allege that Tara suffered hematoma in both arms 
as a result of Ms. Neumann's actions. 
 
Later that day, Mr. Hedges contacted his attorney, 
Warren Clark. The next day, April 9, 1996, the Hedges and 
Mr. Clark met with Principal Musco at 7:20 a.m. Nurse 
Kiely called Urgent Care at approximately 7:30 a.m. that 
same morning for the results of Tara's drug and alcohol 
tests. The test results were negative for drugs and alcohol, 
and NHRHS readmitted Tara in time for her second period 
class on April 9th. 
 
When Tara returned to school that day, a student 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Urgent Care is now known as "Health Net Medical Group of New 
Jersey." 
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approached her and told her that he had overheard Nurse 
Kiely on the phone when she was obtaining Tara's results. 
The student told Tara that he heard Nurse Kiely say, 
"Negative? Are you sure? You are kidding. I am shocked." 
App. 406 (Tara Hedges Deposition). By the end of the 
school day, many students knew that Tara had been tested 
for drugs and alcohol. Thirty to forty students asked Tara 
what had happened and asked to see the bruises on her 
arms; they asked if she had been caught using drugs. Tara 
perceived that the students believed that she had actually 
done something wrong. Tara further testified that she has 
lost friends as a result of the incident and also has lost a 
number of babysitting jobs. 
 
The plaintiffs filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983. They allege that the NHRHS Defendants subjected 
their daughter to an intrusive search, including the testing 
of bodily fluids, without reasonable suspicion, in violation 
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments' protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures and in 
violation of the New Jersey Constitution. Plaintiffs further 
allege that defendants disclosed the results of the search to 
NHRHS students in violation of their daughter's right to 
privacy under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Plaintiffs' third claim is that the NHRHS drug testing policy 
is unconstitutionally vague. Finally, plaintiffs assert a 
pendent state-law claim for assault and battery against the 
medical defendants. 
 
The defendants moved for summary judgment on all 
counts, and the plaintiffs made a cross-motion for 
summary judgment with respect to their claims that the 
search violated both the United States and New Jersey 
Constitutions. The District Court granted the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' 
cross-motion for summary judgment. See Hedges v. Musco, 
33 F. Supp.2d 369 (D.N.J. 1999). This appeal followed.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Plaintiffs have not appealed the District Court's decision to grant 
defendants' motion for summary judgment on Counts V and VI of the 
Complaint, which alleged that the NHRHS school board and its 
individual members "were deliberately indifferent to the rights of 
plaintiff 
in that they failed to adequately train, supervise, and control faculty 
and 
 
staff of NHRHS in the procedures to be followed if a student is suspected 
of substance abuse." App. 10. Accordingly, we will not review those 
claims. 
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II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1331 and 1343(a)(3). This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction over the District Court's final order. See id. 
S 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court's 
decision to grant summary judgment. See Wicker v. Consol. 
Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 696 (3d Cir. 1998). Summary 
judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
 
III. 
 
The New Jersey legislature has promulgated a statutory 
scheme designed to combat the problems of drug and 
alcohol abuse in New Jersey schools. See N.J.S.A. 
S 18A:40A-8 et seq.5 As a part of that scheme, the following 
provision was enacted: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The statute provides in relevant part: 
 
       Whenever it shall appear to any teaching staff member, school nurse 
       or other educational personnel of any public school in this State 
       that a pupil may be under the influence of substances as defined 
       pursuant to section 2 of this act, other than anabolic steroids, 
that 
       teaching staff member, school nurse or other educational personnel 
       shall report the matter as soon as possible to the school nurse or 
       medical inspector, as the case may be, or to a substance awareness 
       coordinator, and to the principal or, in his absence, to his 
designee. 
       The principal or his designee, shall immediately notify the parent 
or 
       guardian and the superintendent of schools, if there be one, or the 
       administrative principal and shall arrange for an immediate 
       examination of the pupil by a doctor selected by the parent or 
       guardian, or if that doctor is not immediately available, by the 
       medical inspector, if he is available. . . . The pupil shall be 
examined 
       as soon as possible for the purpose of diagnosing whether or not 
the 
 
       pupil is under such influence. A written report of that examination 
       shall be furnished within 24 hours by the examining physician to 
       the parent or guardian of the pupil and to the superintendent of 
       schools or administrative principal. 
 
N.J.S.A. 18A:40A-12. The regulations enacted pursuant to that title 
require that the "[d]istrict board of education . . . adopt and implement 
policies and procedures for the evaluation . . . of pupils . . . who on 
reasonable grounds are suspected of being under the influence." N.J.A.C. 
S 6:29-6.3. The NHRHS Policy is an effort to comply with this mandate. 
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       No action of any kind in any court of competent 
       jurisdiction shall lie against any teaching staff member, 
       including a substance awareness coordinator, any 
       school nurse or other educational personnel, medical 
       inspector, examining physician or any other officer, 
       agent or any employee of the board of education or 
       personnel of the emergency room of a hospital because 
       of any action taken by virtue of the provisions of this 
       act, provided the skill and care given is that ordinarily 
       required and exercised by other teaching staff 
       members, nurses, educational personnel, medical 
       inspectors, physicians or other officers, agents, or any 
       employees of the board of education or emergency 
       room personnel. 
 
N.J.S.A. S 18A:40A-13. The District Court, relying on that 
provision, held that Mr. McDonald, Nurse Kiely, and Mr. 
Musco, as school officials within the meaning of the statute, 
were immune from the plaintiffs' suit. 
 
In Good v. Dauphin Co. Social Serv. for Children and 
Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1091 (3d Cir. 1989), however, we 
held that "state law cannot immunize government 
employees from liability resulting from their violation of 
federal law." We explained: 
 
       [A state] immunity statute, although effective against a 
       state tort claim, has no force when applied to suits 
       under the Civil Rights Acts. The supremacy clause of 
       the Constitution prevents a state from immunizing 
       entities or individuals alleged to have violated federal 
       law. This result follows whether the suit to redress 
       federal rights is brought in state or federal court. Were 
       the rule otherwise, a state legislature would be able to 
       frustrate the objectives of a federal statute. 
 
Id. (quoting Wade v. City of Pittsburgh , 765 F.2d 405, 407- 
408 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)). 
 
The District Court, therefore, erred in holding that the 
school officials were immunized from plaintiffs' federal 
claims by the New Jersey statute.6 Because we may affirm 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The District Court did not address whether the state statute provides 
immunity to the defendants from plaintiffs' state constitutional claims 
 
                                9 
 
 
a district court's grant of summary judgment on any 
ground that appears in the record, however, we will proceed 
to consider the merits of plaintiffs' case. 
 
IV. 
 
The NHRHS defendants assert qualified immunity as an 
alternative ground for affirming the District Court. As the 
Supreme Court has recognized, however, "even afinding of 
qualified immunity requires some determination about the 
state of constitutional law at the time the officer[s] acted." 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 
(1998). Because "[a]n immunity determination, with nothing 
more, provides no clear standard, constitutional or 
nonconstitutional," id., and because we ultimately conclude 
that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, we will address plaintiffs' Fourth 
Amendment claim on the merits. See Medeiros v. O'Connell, 
150 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing that"the 
Supreme Court expressed its preference that courts 
address first the merits of the constitutional claims 
presented before turning to an analysis of qualified 
immunity" and affirming on the merits). 
 
In T.L.O. v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court recognized 
that "[i]t is now beyond dispute that `the Federal 
Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state 
officers.' Equally indisputable is the proposition that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of students 
against encroachment by public school officials." 469 U.S. 
325, 334 (1985) (quoting Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 
206, 213 (1960)). Nevertheless, the Court decided that the 
probable cause standard, applicable to most warrantless 
searches, was not appropriate in a school setting. See id. at 
341. Rather, the Court explained: 
        [T]he legality of a search of a student should depend 
       simply on the reasonableness, under all the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
brought under Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. We 
need not decide the issue, however, because as we will explain, we 
ultimately conclude that the NHRHS defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment on the merits of the state claim. See infra note 12. 
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       circumstances, of the search. Determining the 
       reasonableness of the search involves a twofold inquiry: 
       first, one must consider "whether the . . . action was 
       justified at its inception," Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. [1,] 20 
       [(1968)]; second, one must determine whether the 
       search as actually conducted "was reasonably related 
       in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
       interference in the first place," ibid. Under ordinary 
       circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher will 
       be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable 
       grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up 
       evidence that the student has violated or is violated 
       either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search 
       will be permissible in its scope when the measures 
       adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the 
       search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age 
       and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. 
 
Id. at 341-42 (footnotes omitted). 
 
The Supreme Court has recently said that "[a]rticulating 
precisely what `reasonable suspicion' . . . mean[s] is not 
possible." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 
(1996). It is a "commonsense, nontechnical conception[ ] 
that deal[s] with the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not 
legal technicians, act." Id. (internal quotation omitted); see 
also Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 495 (3d Cir. 1995) 
("The test for reasonable suspicion is a totality of the 
circumstances inquiry."). 
 
Applying those legal principles to the facts of this case, 
we hold that defendants McDonald, Kiely, and Musco's 
suspicion that Tara was "high" was reasonable. In addition, 
we believe that the searches were reasonable in scope and 
not excessively intrusive. 
 
A. Mr. McDonald, Nurse Kiely and the School Search 
 
As we have explained, when Tara entered Mr. McDonald's 
class on the morning of April 8, 1996, she was behaving in 
an uncharacteristically gregarious manner. In addition, her 
face was flushed; her eyes were glassy and red; and her 
pupils were dilated. Then during class, Tara, after obtaining 
permission to leave the room to get a drink of water, 
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proceeded in the opposite direction, disappeared around the 
corner of the hallway, and did not return for approximately 
ten minutes. All of this was inconsistent with Tara's normal 
behavior and appearance. In our view, these facts gave Mr. 
McDonald a sufficiently "particularized and objective basis" 
for suggesting that Tara be examined by the school nurse. 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981). 
While, as plaintiffs point out, Tara's speech was not 
slurred, McDonald did not smell anything on her breath, 
and she did not smell of marijuana, those facts do not 
undermine the reasonableness of McDonald's suspicion. 
Tara may not have possessed every characteristic that may 
be exhibited by a person who has consumed alcohol or 
other drugs, but the symptoms she did manifest created a 
reasonable suspicion that she had consumed some quantity 
of alcohol or other drugs. McDonald had reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that a further and more 
comprehensive evaluation of Tara might produce evidence 
of such consumption. 
 
It bears noting that McDonald did not immediately order 
Tara to submit to a blood test and urinalysis. Rather, 
pursuant to school policy, he had her escorted to Nurse 
Kiely's office for further examination. Because Nurse Kiely's 
examination only involved observing Tara and checking her 
vital signs, we hold that the scope of the search at this 
point was reasonably related to its objectives and not 
excessively intrusive given the age and sex of the student 
and the nature of the infraction. Because requiring Tara to 
submit to Nurse Kiely's examination represents the full 
extent of McDonald's participation in the relevant events, 
McDonald's conduct did not amount to a Fourth 
Amendment violation. 
 
Before Nurse Kiely conducted her "vital signs" 
examination, her own observations in her office led her to 
conclude that Tara's behavior and appearance were 
abnormal and consistent with her having consumed alcohol 
or another drug. Given those observations and McDonald's 
report, Nurse Kiely's ensuing, limited examination did not, 
in our view, constitute an unreasonable search. 7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We do not understand Nurse Kiely to have participated in the 
subsequent decision to require a blood test and urinalysis. If she bears 
any responsibility for that decision, she has noS 1983 liability to the 
plaintiffs for the same reason, as explained hereafter, that Principal 
Musco has no such liability. 
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A recent decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
supports our analysis. The case, Bridgman v. New Trier 
High School Dist. No. 203, 128 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir. 1997), 
involved facts similar to those at issue here. The Court 
summarized the facts in that case as follows: 
 
       Dailey noticed that Bridgman and several other 
       students were giggling and acting in an unruly fashion. 
       Bridgman acknowledges that he was laughing with the 
       other students, but denies being unruly. Dailey states 
       that while the other students quickly calmed down, 
       Bridgman remained distracted and behaved 
       inappropriately during the program. Dailey says she 
       noticed that Bridgman's eyes were bloodshot and his 
       pupils dilated. She also claims that his handwriting 
       was erratic on a worksheet that he completed as part 
       of the program, and that some of his answers were 
       "flippant." 
 
       * * * 
 
       After Bridgman had spoken to his mother, Dailey took 
       him into another adjoining room, where she had the 
       school's Health Services Coordinator, Nurse Joanne 
       Swanson, administer a "medical assessment" of 
       Bridgman. The assessment consisted of taking 
       Bridgman's blood pressure and pulse. Swanson noted 
       that both of these readings were considerably higher 
       than those listed on the record of Bridgman's freshman 
       physical examination. Swanson was concerned about 
       the high blood pressure and pulse measurements, but 
       at no time reached the conclusion that Bridgman was 
       under the influence of drugs. She also noted that 
       Bridgman's pupils were dilated, but did not notice that 
       his eyes were bloodshot, or that he was acting 
       strangely in any way. 
 
Id. at 1147, 1148. The following day, at his mother's 
instruction, the student underwent a drug test, which 
indicated that he had not in fact been using marijuana. The 
student then brought suit under S 1983, alleging that the 
medical assessment and a subsequent search of his outer 
clothing were unreasonable and, thus, violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
 
                                13 
 
 
The Court rejected his claim, holding that "[t]he 
symptoms were sufficient to ground Daily's suspicion, and 
the medical assessment was reasonably calculated to 
uncover further evidence of the suspected drug use." Id. at 
1149. The analysis conducted by the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals suggests that, where a teacher's suspicion is 
based on objective facts that suggest that a student may be 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, an examination of 
the kind here performed by Nurse Kiely will be permissible.8 
 
B. Principal Musco and the Urgent Care Search 
 
In T.L.O., the Supreme Court, after concluding that it was 
reasonable for a teacher to search a student's purse for 
cigarettes after being informed that the student was 
smoking in the lavatory, further held that additional 
information secured in the course of the search warranted 
more intrusive, follow-up searches. See 469 U.S. at 347. 
TLO thus "justifies escalating searches . .. if the discovery 
of new evidence warrants them." Recent case, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 1341, 1345-46 (1997). 
 
Here, too, the information learned as the investigation 
progressed provided additional justification for the decision 
to require a blood test and urinalysis. After Tara arrived at 
Nurse Kiely's office and before she went to the Urgent Care 
for the blood test and urinalysis, Principal Musco learned 
that her blood pressure was above normal, and that she 
was unable to remember her parents' day-time phone 
numbers. In addition, at some point during this process, 
Tara's book bag was searched.9 An old pill bottle, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Plaintiffs assert that their case is more like another case from the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Willis v. Anderson Community School 
Corp., 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998). We disagree. In Willis, a student 
was suspended for fighting with a fellow student and, based solely on 
the fact that he had been in a fight, the school required him to be tested 
for drug and alcohol use before being allowed to return to school. Even 
though the school submitted evidence tending to show that students 
who fight are more likely to use drugs than other students, the Court 
held that a single fight did not create a reasonable suspicion. See id. at 
418-19. The Court expressly distinguished Bridgman on the ground that 
the student there exhibited multiple signs of drug use. See id. at 419-20. 
We find the present case similarly distinguishable. 
 
9. Plaintiffs do not challenge the constitutionality of this search. 
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containing two different types of unidentified pills, was 
discovered there. As Tara had not registered any 
medications with the Nurse, her possession of those pills -- 
whether they were illegal drugs or not -- was a violation of 
school policy. Tara's explanation for the pills was that they 
were diet pills, but her father informed Principal Musco 
that he was confident Tara was not on a diet. 
 
Based on the combination of Mr. McDonald's 
observations (which were confirmed, except for the dilated 
pupils, by the Nurse) and this newly gathered evidence, it 
simply cannot be said that Principal Musco lacked 
reasonable grounds for concluding that a further search 
would produce additional evidence of drug consumption.10 
 
Accordingly, we turn to the issue of whether the search 
ordered by Principal Musco was reasonably related to its 
objectives and not excessively intrusive given the age and 
sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. 
Certainly a drug test is reasonably related to the objective 
of determining whether a student is under the influence; 
the issue then is whether a urinalysis and blood test were 
excessively intrusive given the nature of the suspected 
infraction. 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that "collecting 
samples for urinalysis intrudes upon `an excretory function 
traditionally shielded by great privacy.' " Vernonia School 
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995) (quoting 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 
626 (1989)). The Court cautioned, however, that"the degree 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In contrast, in Sostarecz v. Misko, No. CIV. A. 97-CV-2112, 1999 WL 
239401 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 1999), the district court held that an 
additional search was not warranted. In that case, a student was 
suspected of using drugs solely by virtue of the fact that she exhibited 
inappropriate behavior in class. The student was sent to the nurse's 
office, but the nurse's test produced only normal results. Nevertheless, 
the school official proceeded to strip search the student in an effort to 
find further evidence of drug use. The district court held that, "once 
[the 
 
nurse's] test produced normal results, the Court does not believe that a 
reasonable person would then force the student to remove her pants so 
that her legs could be checked for signs of drug use." Id. at *6. This 
case 
 
is materially different. 
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of intrusion depends upon the manner in which production 
of the urine sample is monitored." Id. In Vernonia,11 the 
Supreme Court observed: 
 
       Under the District's Policy, male students produce 
       samples at a urinal along a wall. They remain fully 
       clothed and are only observed from behind, if at all. 
       Female students produce samples in an enclosed stall, 
       with a female monitor standing outside listening only 
       for sounds of tampering. These conditions are nearly 
       identical to those typically encountered in public 
       restrooms, which men, women, and especially school 
       children use daily. Under such conditions, privacy 
       interests compromised by the process of obtaining 
       urine samples are in our view negligible. 
 
Id. 
 
In this case, Tara's urinalysis was performed at a private 
medical clinic. Nurse Neumann described the urinalysis 
procedure as follows: 
 
       The patient would be sent to the lavatory, where the 
       water has previously been turned off. . . . The patient 
       takes the large container and goes into the restroom 
       and fills it up. . . . They bring it back into the room. 
       . . . I check the temperature on it, then they pour it 
       into the containers. . . . The patient goes into the 
       bathroom with the cup by themselves. We don't go in 
       with him -- with them. 
 
App. 432-34. Based on Vernonia, we hold that the 
urinalysis performed on Tara Hedges was not excessively 
intrusive given the age and sex of the student and the 
nature of the infraction. 
 
In addition to the urinalysis, Principal Musco ordered 
that a blood-alcohol test be performed. Plaintiffs assert that 
"either a saliva strip or the breathalyser are more effective 
tools to determine alcohol use . . . and are less intrusive 
than a blood test." Brief for Appellant at 44. Plaintiffs 
misconceive T.L.O.'s standard, however. T.L.O. did not hold 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In Vernonia, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
suspicionless drug testing of student athletes. 
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that the search must be the least intrusive way of achieving 
its objectives; it held that the search must not be 
excessively intrusive. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. 
Therefore, the mere fact that there are less intrusive means 
of ascertaining whether a student has consumed alcohol, 
though perhaps probative, is not dispositive of the 
reasonableness of the search. 
 
The Supreme Court has upheld the use of blood-alcohol 
tests in a multitude of cases. In Schmerber v. California, the 
Court explained: 
 
       Extraction of blood samples for testing is a highly 
       effective means of determining the degree to which a 
       person is under the influence of alcohol. . . . Such tests 
       are a [sic] commonplace in these days of periodic 
       physical examination and experience with them 
       teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, 
       and that for most people the procedure involves 
       virtually no risk, trauma, or pain. 
 
384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (citation and footnote omitted); 
see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn. , 489 
U.S. 602, 625 (1989) ("the intrusion occasioned by a blood 
test is not significant"); Winston v. Lee , 470 U.S. 753, 762 
(1985) ("society's judgment [is] that blood tests do not 
constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an 
individual's privacy and bodily integrity"); South Dakota v. 
Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983) ("The simple blood-alcohol 
test is . . . safe, painless, and commonplace"); Breithaupt v. 
Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957) ("The blood test procedure 
has become routine in our everyday life"). Based on these 
Supreme Court precedents, we hold that requiring Tara to 
submit to a blood-alcohol test, administered by 
professionals in a medical testing clinic, was reasonable, 
taking into account her age, sex, and the nature of the 
suspected infraction. 
 
In summary, we conclude that the searches of Tara 
Hedges were reasonable under all the circumstances. 12 See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Having established that there was no federal constitutional violation, 
defendants must also prevail on plaintiffs' claims under Article I, 
paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. See Desilets v. Clearview 
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T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. Each was justified at its inception 
and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place. 13 See id. at 341- 
42. Summary judgment in favor of the NHRHS defendants 
on the unreasonable search claims was therefore 
appropriate. 
 
V. 
 
Plaintiffs' second claim is that the NHRHS defendants 
violated Tara's right to privacy under the Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments by disclosing the results of the 
drug tests. It is well established that the constitutional 
right to privacy protects two types of privacy interests: "One 
is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters, and another is the interest in independence in 
making certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v. 
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (footnotes omitted). 
Plaintiffs' asserted privacy interest falls within the first 
class. The District Court rejected this claim, holding that 
the results of the drug tests were not medical records and, 
thus, were not entitled to privacy protection. See Hedges v. 
Musco, 33 F. Supp.2d 369, 381 (D.N.J. 1999). Wefind it 
unnecessary to reach the question of whether the results of 
the drug tests were entitled to constitutional privacy 
protection, because we perceive no nexus between the 
injury plaintiffs allege that Tara suffered and Nurse Kiely's 
inadvertent revelation of the results of Tara's drug tests. 
 
It is axiomatic that "[a] S 1983 action, like its state tort 
analogs, employs the principle of proximate causation." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Regional Bd. of Educ., 627 A.2d 667, 673 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1993) 
("We are not persuaded that the New Jersey Constitution provides 
greater protection under the circumstances of this case than its federal 
counterpart. We note that in its T.L.O. opinion the New Jersey Supreme 
Court analyzed the search and seizure issue under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and did not suggest that 
New Jersey's organic law imposed more stringent standards."). 
 
13. Because we conclude that the search was reasonable, we need not 
reach the NHRHS defendants' argument that plaintiffs consented to the 
search. 
 
                                18 
 
 
Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 
1999) (citations omitted); see also Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 
F.3d 858, 872 (2d Cir. 1998) ("as in all S 1983 cases, the 
plaintiff must prove that the defendant's action was a 
proximate cause of the plaintiff 's injury"); Kneipp v. Tedder, 
95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996) (in a S 1983 suit, "[a] 
plaintiff must . . . establish that the government policy or 
custom was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained"). 
"To establish the necessary causation, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate a `plausible nexus' or `affirmative link' between 
the [defendant's action] and the specific deprivation of 
constitutional rights at issue." Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 
F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). 
 
In this case, plaintiffs allege that Tara was injured by the 
NHRHS defendants' disclosure of the results of her drug 
tests. Specifically, Tara testified that she perceived that 
students suspected that she had done something wrong. 
She further testified that she has lost friends as a result of 
the incident and also has lost a number of babysitting jobs. 
Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestions, however, it seems clear 
that Nurse Kiely's revelation of the results of the drug tests 
was not the proximate cause of the damages Tara claims to 
have suffered. Rather, given that those results were 
negative, it seems evident that any damages plaintiffs 
suffered were caused by students' knowledge of the fact 
that Tara was drug tested, not Nurse Kiely's disclosure of 
the tests' results. Accord Townes, 176 F.3d at 148 
(dismissing claims and noting that "there is a gross 
disconnect between the constitutional violations[alleged] 
. . . and the injury or harm for which [plaintiff] seeks 
recovery . . ."). Indeed, to the extent disclosure of the 
negative results had any effect on the plaintiffs, it was to 
mitigate the damages caused by the fact that Tara was drug 
tested. Because we "conclude that no reasonable jury could 
find [Nurse Kiley's disclosure of the results of the drug 
tests] to be the cause of [plaintiffs'] injury," we hold that the 
District Court properly entered summary judgment against 
the plaintiffs on their privacy claim.14  Taylor v. Brentwood 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. In their briefs to this Court plaintiffs have argued only that 
disclosure of the results of the drug tests violated Tara's right to 
privacy. 
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Union Free School Dist., 143 F.3d 679, 687 (2d Cir. 1998); 
see Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 872 (to recover under S 1983, 
"the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's action was a 
proximate cause of the plaintiff 's injury"). 
 
VI. 
 
Plaintiffs' third claim is that the NHRHS drug testing 
policy is unconstitutionally vague. The District Court 
dismissed this claim because the plaintiffs failed to plead it 
in their complaint. See 33 F. Supp.2d at 383. Plaintiffs 
concede that the issue is not raised in their complaint and 
that they have never sought leave to amend, but they 
contend that, because the defendants were on notice of the 
claim and even briefed the issue (apparently without raising 
the procedural defense), "the better course would have been 
to decide the issue on the merits." Brief for Appellant at 51; 
see Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(holding that, although the issue was not raised in the 
complaint or plaintiff 's motion for summary judgment, 
where district court was on notice that there was an issue 
and parties addressed it on the merits, we may reach the 
merits of the claim); Venuto v. Carella, Byrne, Bain, Gilfillan, 
Cecchi & Stewart, P.C., 11 F.3d 385, 388 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(same). Because the NHRHS defendants do not argue to us 
that the issue has been waived and instead address it on 
the merits, we will entertain the plaintiffs' vagueness claim. 
 
Plaintiffs challenge the following provision of the NHRHS 
school board's drug/alcohol policy: "Any staff member to 
whom it appears that a pupil may be under the influence 
of alcoholic beverages or other drugs on school property or 
at a school function shall report the matter as soon as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
See Brief for Appellant at 46 ("The [district] court erred as a matter of 
law 
when it dismissed plaintiff 's constitutional claim based on the 
disclosure 
 
by the defendants of the results of the testing . . . ."); id. at 49 
(arguing 
that there were no adequate safeguards to protect against disclose of the 
test results). The parties have not briefed, and we express no opinion on, 
whether under circumstances of this kind, a student in Tara's position 
can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the fact that she was 
investigated for drug use. 
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possible to the Principal or his/her designee." App. 26. 
Plaintiffs assert that "[t]he flaw in the NHRHS policy is that 
the language `any staff member to whom it appears that a 
pupil is under the influence' provides no particularized and 
objective basis to guide the staff member to make an 
informed decision to refer the student to drug testing." Brief 
for Appellant at 53 (emphasis in original). In addition, they 
argue that the policy does not require reasonable suspicion. 
 
We reject these arguments. The passage about which 
plaintiffs complain requires no more than that the teacher 
report the matter to the principal or the school nurse. 
Notably, the policy does not provide that the school may 
search any student who appears to be "under the 
influence," regardless of reasonable suspicion. Rather, the 
policy expressly instructs that the nurse or principal "will 
evaluate the student's condition," and that the principal or 
nurse may conduct a search only if there is reasonable 
suspicion. App. 28. Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestions, the 
school policy does not authorize the search and medical 
testing of every student who appears to a teacher to be 
under the influence. 
 
VII. 
 
The District Court, having dismissed all of plaintiffs' 
S 1983 claims and finding no extraordinary circumstances, 
refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
plaintiffs' state-law claims against Ultra Care and Barbara 
Neumann. See 33 F. Supp.2d at 383. Plaintiffs insist that 
this was an abuse of discretion. 
 
Though it did not cite to S 1367, it is clear from that the 
District Court relied on the following provision in 
dismissing plaintiffs' state law claims: 
 
       (a) . . . [I]n any civil action of which the  district courts 
       have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have 
       supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are 
       so related to claims in the action within such original 
       jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 
       controversy under Article III of the United States 
       Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall 
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       include claims that involve the joinder or intervention 
       of additional parties. . . . 
 
       (c) The district courts may decline to exercise 
 840supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 
 
       subsection (a) if . . . (3) the district court has dismissed 
       all claims over which it has original jurisdiction .. . . 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1367(a), (c). 
 
We recently addressed S 1367(c)(3) in Figueroa v. 
Buccaneer Hotel, Inc., 188 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 1999). Like this 
case, "[t]he District Court [there] made no reference to 
section 1367 in its order dismissing Figueroa's remaining 
[state] claims . . . ." Id. at 181. The Court "deduce[d] from 
the language of the District Court, however, that the court 
was aware that it had the discretion to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over these claims under section 
1367, but declined to do so based on the consideration set 
forth in section 1367(c)(3), namely, the dismissal of all 
claims over which the court had original jurisdiction." Id. 
The Court held that, "where we can readily determine that 
the District Court dismissed a claimant's remaining claims 
based on a consideration enumerated in section 1367(c), it 
is not reversible error for the court to not state its reasons 
for doing so." Id. Following Figueroa , we find no reversible 
error in the District Court's failure expressly to mention 
S 1367(c)(3), because it is clear from the Court's opinion 
that it was relying on that provision. 
 
This Court has recognized that, "where the claim over 
which the district court has original jurisdiction is 
dismissed before trial, the district court must  decline to 
decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of 
judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties 
provide an affirmative justification for doing so." Borough of 
West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(emphasis added). The only fairness consideration to which 
plaintiffs point is that the statute of limitations on the 
assault and battery claim has run.15 At first glance, this 
argument is compelling. See Beck v. Prupis, 162 F.3d 1090, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The statute of limitations is two years and, thus, expired on April 7, 
1998. 
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1100 (11th Cir. 1998) (discussing pre-section 1367 law) 
("The possibility of a claim being time-barred is an 
important factor in deciding whether to maintain 
jurisdiction over pendent claims once the federal claims 
have been resolved; dismissing state law claims for which 
the statute of limitations has run will often constitute an 
abuse of discretion.") (citing cases); Cooley v. Pennsylvania 
Housing Finance Agency, 830 F.2d 469, 476 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(same). 
 
Congress foresaw the precise problem plaintiffs raise in 
this case, however, and prescribed a cure. When it codified 
the law of supplemental jurisdiction, Congress expressly 
provided: 
 
       The period of limitations for any claim asserted under 
       section (a), and for any other claim in the same action 
       that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or 
       after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), 
       shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a 
       period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law 
       provides for a longer tolling period. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1367(d); see also Beck v. Prupis, 162 F.3d at 
1099-1100 ("a dismissal under section 1367 tolls the 
statute of limitations on the dismissed claims for 30 days"); 
Seabrook v. Jacobson, 153 F.3d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1998) 
("Section 1367(d) ensures that the plaintiff whose 
supplemental jurisdiction is dismissed has at least thirty 
days after dismissal to refile in state court."). Plaintiffs' 
state claims were, therefore, not time-barred at the time the 
District Court dismissed them. Accordingly, we find no 
abuse of discretion. 
 
VIII. 
 
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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